| schema:description 2 | "内容記述: Part 1. Theoretical Background: Chapter 1. Rules, Games and Common-Po0l Resource Problems: Common-Pool Resource Problems; Conceptual Foundations and Key Terms; Classifying CPR Situations: Appropriation and Provision; CPR Situations and CPR Dilemmas; Coordinated Strategies to Resolve CPR Dilemmas; The Central Questions to Be Addressed; The Plan for This Book; Chapter 2. Institutional Analysis and Common-Pool Resources: Models, Theories, and Frameworks, Historical Roots of IAD; The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework; The Action Situation; Actors; Factors Affecting Action Arenas; Linking Action Arenas; Multiple Levels of Analysis; Multiple Levels of Analysis and Solving Higher-Order Dilemmas; Conclusions; Chapter 3. Game Appropriators Play: The Use of Formal Models; CPR Games with Two Players and Two Strategies; Repeated CPR Games; Conclusions; Chapter 4. Rules and Games: How Rules Affect the Structure of a Game; Some Empirical Examples of Changes in Authority Rules; Fishing Rules and Fishing Games; Outcome Comparison; Conclusions. Part 2. Experimental Studies: Chapter 5. CPR Baseline Appropriation Experiments: CPR Appropriation; Appropriation Behavior in the Laboratory; Conclusions; Appendix 5.1.: CPR Provision Problems: Zero Provision Environments and a Simple Contribution Mechanism; Discrete Public Goods and VCM; Discrete Public Goods and Alternative Contribution Mechanisms; Appendix 5.2.: Experimental Numbers; Appendix 5.3.: Market 2 Group Investment Decisions; Chapter 6. Probabilistic Destination of the CPR: Model of a Destructible CPR; Finite Deterministic Repetition of the Constituent Game; The Experimental Design; Experimental Results; Conclusions; Appendix 6.1.: Across Period Behavior: Tokens Invested in Market 2; Chapter 7. Communication in the Commons: Communication: Theoretical Issues; One-Shot Costless Communication; Repeated Costless Communication; Costly Communication; Conclusions; Chapter 8. Sanctioning and Communication Institutions: Sanctioning in the Constituent Game; The Experimental Setting and Results; Conclusions; Chapter 9. Regularities from the Laboratory and Possible Explanations: Why So Much Cooperation in Communication Experiments?; Conclusions. Part 3. Field Studies: Chapter 10. Institutions and Performance in Irrigation Systems, by Shui Yan Tang; Comparing Irrigation Systems; Performance Measures and Linkages among Action Arenas; Matching Rules to Physical Domains; Multiple Levels of Institutional Arrangements; Monitoring and Enforcement Arrangements; Conclusions; Appendix 10.1.: Case Profiles; Chapter 11. Fishers' Institutional Responses to Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas, by Edella Schlager, Coastal Fisheries as Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas; CPR Dilemmas, Complexity, and Coastal Fisheries; Fishers' Responses to CPR Dilemmas; Commons Dilemmas and Organized Fishers; Performance of Fishers' Organizations; Conclusions. Chapter 12. Rules, Rule Making, and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit between Rule Systems and Resource Use, by Arun Agrawal: The Historical Context; The Local Context; Authority Rules Related to Allocation; Monitoring; Sanctioning; Arbitration; Conclusions. Chapter 13. Changing Rules, Changing Games: Evidence from Groundwater Systems in Southern California, by William Blomquist, Groundwater Basins as Common-Pool Resources: The Levels of Action; Linked Action Arenas; Operational-Level Rule Configurations; Operational-Level Rules and Game Structure; Rules, Actions, and Outcomes: Evidence from the Cases; Conclusions. Chapter 14. Regularities from the Field and Possible Explanations, by William Blomquist, Edella Schlager, Shui Yan Tang, and Elinor Ostrom: Commonalities across Organized CPRs; Differences across Organized CPRs; Physical Characteristics That Make a Difference; Conclusions. Part 4. Conclusion: Chapter 15. Cooperation and Social Capital: Theoretical Choices in Doing Policy Analysis; Surmounting CPR Dilemmas....(more)" |